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| The strong negotiate |
| Written by Åëåíà Ìèëàøèíà | ||||||||
| Ñðåäà, 29 Àâãóñò 2007 | ||||||||
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In ‘Novaya Gazeta’, by Elena Milashina How to subdue the terrorists at will without bringing in tanks and flamethrowers for direct fire It has been three years since the Beslan terrorist attack. It was a national tragedy, and does not go to the periphery of our consciousness. Beslan’s lessons need to be studied, whether the authorities wish it, or not. From every corner of the world, they are now coming to Beslan in order to learn this. After Beslan, it was clear that we have very well trained storm troopers. These are people who can sweep any obstacle from the face of the earth. What we do not have, however, are enough people who could help avoid such a disastrous turn of events. What can professional negotiators do? Was there an opportunity calm down We offer our readers an interview with one of the world’s most renowned experts in the field of professional negotiations, Dr. Adam Dolnik. The ‘Novaya’ Dossier
Dr Adam Dolnik constantly lectures, conducts seminars, and advises government intelligence agencies and private organizations in more than thirty countries, including Germany, China, Afghanistan, Colombia, Japan, Britain, Philippines, USA, etc. He is an expert and the author of practical research projects on various terrorist organizations. He is the author of: “The Evolution of Terrorism: Technology, Tactics and Global Trends” (Rutledge, 2007), “The new political terrorism, and particularly the negotiation process during a mass hostage event” (Praeger Security International, 2007), “Beslan. Were negotiations impossible?” (The Royal United Services Institute, 2007). He is also the author of more than 40 reports and articles on topics related to terrorism. He has been studying the specificity of terrorist organizations in Russia, as well as the methods Russian intelligence agencies have used to fight terrorism since the first Chechen campaign. This interview was recorded in Beslan during the summer of 2007. Adam, you maintain that the Beslan terrorist attack, as far as the environment for professional negotiations, could be considered an event of the highest category of complexity. Does this mean that negotiators in Beslan were powerless? All of the accumulated experience of the world today is absolutely unsuitable and unprepared for situations such as Beslan, and here is why: in Beslan, even during the seizure of hostages, people were being killed, and one of the main principles of the negotiation process is that as soon as the hostages are killed, negotiations have become virtually impossible. After this, negotiators occupy a secondary role. That is, they negotiate only in order to gain time for the security forces to prepare a combat operation. If there had been a Beslan in America, I am not sure if it would have ended much better than it did in Russia. I draw this conclusion based on the experience of communicating and working with the people responsible for the resolution of similar situations in America. I do not wish to say that FBI or police experts would have acted the same, but most likely there would have been panic among the national political leaders, and officials at the highest level would have influenced the developments in the direction of a forceful outcome. This does not remove the main problem in these circumstances. When you have more than a thousand hostages, when everything is booby trapped, when the militants are not just ready to blow up the hostages, but also to die alongside them, in this situation is a combat operation really the best way to rescue hostages? So, this is the conclusion that I came to. The killing of several hostages during attacks such as Beslan still does not negate the effectiveness of the negotiation process for the release of the surviving hostages. If you analyze whom the terrorists killed during the capture (of the school), then we can understand why they did this. Take for example Ruslan Betrozov, who was killed during the first hours of capture, in the presence of his children and in a gym full of hostages. The terrorists from the outset ordered everyone to speak only in Russian, but Betrozov stood up and translated the terrorists’ instructions and demands into the Ossetian language. He did exactly what the terrorists had forbidden. He did not obey. That is why he came under attack, as he provoked a situation in which the terrorists were forced to act. This does not absolve the terrorists morally and legally for the responsibility of the death of this brave man, but for negotiators it is extremely important to understand the motives and circumstances surrounding the killing of hostages. After all, this is not the same as when terrorists randomly select a child from the hostages and then shoot him in the head in front of everyone. In Russia, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin’s participation in negotiations in Budennovsk is mostly seen as a demonstration of the weakness of the authorities back then. First of all, we must clearly understand that negotiation by no means is a concession to the terrorists, or an unconditional fulfillment of all their demands. Negotiation is a very complex process that aims to have a psychological effect on terrorists and on their behavior. In extreme situations such as Budyonnovsk it is simply a must, but the fact is that in Budyonnovsk so many mistakes were made that Chernomyrdin’s participation was still not enough to save the situation. A significant error made was the reluctance of the intelligence agencies to negotiate with terrorists from the outset. For example, there was a situation when Basayev demanded a press conference and the authorities refused to even discuss the demand. So Basayev had several police officers shot. The response of the authorities: “Well, let's give them a press conference.” But we cannot encourage such behavior by terrorists. What should have been done was to begin negotiations from the outset. For example, from the outset terrorists set unrealistic demands such as the removal of troops from Chechnya. You know that you cannot do it, so you do not negotiate about it. This is erroneous. There are very many possible options between the two extremes of “fully satisfying terrorist demands” and “we do not negotiate with terrorists.” As I said, negotiating is the ability to influence. If we want to influence someone’s decision we must understand his way of thinking. An effective negotiator is one who knows how to listen and then ask what we call ‘good questions’. In response to an impossible demand such as withdraw troops, you have to ask Basayev: “Why do you need this?” It would seem that the answer to this question would be obvious, right? Everyone knows the answer to this question, but still you ask this question and then they start talking about human rights abuses in Chechnya, about ‘sweeps’, and how civilians are being killed in Chechnya. Then you draw them into a conversation about their own personal experiences: “What happened to you?” Ali (a terrorist during the Beslan school siege — EM) told hostages that he had lost his wife and five children during a bombardment. If they will talk about it with hostages, then they will tell it to negotiators by telephone. Of course, remembering this will make a terrorist angry and emotional. He will scream over the phone: “You killed my family!” But now the negotiator has the chance to say: “I’M SORRY. For you, it must have been terrible.” You are not giving up any position in saying this, but you are showing that you understand why he is angry. You would have reacted the same way had it been your family killed, but at the same time you tell him that nothing can justify the killing of children. Later in the negotiation process, you already have an opportunity to provide a psychological effect on terrorists and to persuade them to release at least the youngest hostages. Perhaps this sounds a bit primitive. Yes, and it is impossible, of course, to give any kind of a strict rule, because every situation is different. In general, however, this is an example of how one should set up the negotiation process. Empathy is the key to influence. In this it is important to understand that empathy does not necessarily mean sympathy, just as understanding does not mean agreement. Can it be somehow explained why the terrorists did not blow up the hostages at At Basayev understood that the probability of an assault was very high. If it was possible to achieve the withdrawal of troops from Chechnya, that would be good, but if not, Basayev was going to make an assault very difficult for the Russian security services by killing as many people as possible, and in the end this is what happened — almost every hostage who died, died because of the gas. This was a political maneuver. The terrorists did not come to kill the hostages, but, on the contrary, they were ready to release the hostages. Why do I think this? The gas was released into the music hall more than 20 minutes (before the assault — EM), and the terrorists saw the gas as it was being released. They were able to blow up the auditorium, and even if the bombs had been faulty, they had time to shoot the hostages with automatic weapons. They did not, however, and there was a reason for this. What do the experts now tell you about this situation? Would it have been possible to negotiate the release of hostages? As for During In Beslan, the terrorists treated the hostages very poorly… At No, at Stockholm syndrome is not only when the hostages are emotionally imbued with the terrorists, but also vice versa? The situation develops at both ends, and it is very interesting from the political standpoint. Stockholm syndrome is what governments hate, because the hostages go and start to defend the terrorists and toss all the blame onto the government. Negotiators, however, like Stockholm syndrome. The negotiator is simply obliged to instigate and encourage the formation of this syndrome by any means possible, because if the terrorists and the hostages would like each other, then it would be less likely that the hostages will do something stupid that will cause a severe reaction on the part of the terrorists. The terrorists, in turn, would find it extremely difficult to decide to kill hostages for whom they feel sympathy. The way to form Stockholm syndrome is to make the terrorists and the hostages interact with each other. Is there a practice in other countries of providing for analysis recordings of the negotiating process with terrorists? Yes, there is such a practice. In American, for example, this is even provided for by law. How would you rate the professional activities of Vitaly Zangionov, the official negotiator from the North Ossetia FSB (at Beslan)? I got the impression that Zangionov was acting completely in accordance with instructions, as if in front of him he had a negotiations textbook. He would ask: “Do you need a doctor? Do you need the media? Do you need safe passage?” The problem was that the negotiation process was just a formality. It was only to create an alibi: “We have done everything possible, we offered them But the thing is, these are people who have prepared for months for this operation (hostage taking), and we cannot just tell them on the second day of the hostage taking that they are free to withdraw from the school. They describe themselves as suicide bombers willing to die for their goal, and then you go and tell them that they can go home? Yes, of course they will not agree! If you made them that proposal, say, three months after the hostage taking, by then their reaction might be different… The logic of the people who seized the hostages, to them it seems that they have enormous power, so they ask you for a million dollars and a plane, but 12 or 15 hours later they will ask for a hamburger and a moped. There is a change of expectations and goals, a change in the hierarchy of needs (priorities). The negotiation process is a process of lowering the demands and needs of the terrorists. For negotiators, therefore, time is very important. The longer the situation drags on, the more opportunities there are to reach an agreement or release more hostages. But as we have seen at Yes, there was an ultimatum with a clearly defined time limit: if you do not release the hostages in three days, there will be an assault. This is a huge problem, by the way, when it is the government that is doing this. Negotiators already have enough reasons for stress, without putting a deadline on them. But there was no official deadline at I talked a lot with Larissa Kudzieva (a very brave woman who was able to make contact with the terrorists in the gym and thus assist many of the hostages — EM), she is, by the way, an extremely good negotiator by nature. The militant Ali, who talked with Zangionov (by phone), told Kudzieva that he did not want to blow up the school, but on the phone they told him that Russia would never negotiate with terrorists and that the militants had three days to think about it. If we carefully analyze the events in Budennovsk, Kizlyar, and In this context, what do you think about the initiative by Dzasokhov and Aushev to involve Maskhadov in negotiations? Aushev told me that it was his initiative. Politkovskaya also played a part by trying to attract Maskhadov through Zakayev on the first day of the hostage taking. In a pure case (and this applies to negotiators who want just one thing — to release the hostages) you want to attract the maximum amount of resources for this. Maskhadov would have been a very strong resource to have an effect on the terrorists. Do you think that if Maskhadov, or at least Zakayev, had come to Beslan, it could have saved the hostages? I think, first of all, Maskhadov and Zakayev could not have come to Beslan. This was ruled out. The Kremlin could not afford for Maskhadov the terrorist to save hostages. They could not allow him to become a hero. It was a problem of losing face? Yes. If Maskhadov were too controversial a figure for the negotiation process, at the time could it have been possible to find someone more acceptable? I think it could have been possible to use Aushev more efficiently. He was respected among the terrorists. He went into school, and brought out mothers with children. Then again, the authorities had the same problem as with Maskhadov, but to a lesser extent, of course. This informal leader, the former president of Ingushetia, Aushev, could have become a hero, and the Kremlin did not need that, because of the prevailing local policy in the Caucasus. That is the only explanation that I can find, as to why they so poorly used Aushev as a resource. After all, he could well have convinced the terrorists to release the children from the school. So why was he not used? I just do not understand this. For all three days, the terrorists insisted on the appearance of four people at the school: Zyazikov, Dzasokhov, Roshal, and Aslakhanov. Could the operational headquarters meet this demand? I am almost certain that the terrorists would have killed Zyazikov. There had been several (assassination) attempts on him before Beslan (and these efforts continue to this day — EM). As far as Dzasokhov, Roshal and Aslakhanov, I am not sure, but of course, the risk was very high. Perhaps it they were right not to let anyone go there? This is a question of negotiating tactics. If you put the question thus: all or nothing, then you are in a dead end. Would you like to hear my vision of what the headquarters should have done in response to the demand to bring these four to the school? First of all, you do everything possible that these four men come to Beslan as quickly as possible. Put them on television. The militants watched television and would know that the four were in Beslan. Then you say: “You wanted them to come, they are here and ready to talk with you over the phone.” The terrorists will say that all of them together must enter the school. Your answer: “They are brave people. They are willing to do anything to save the children, but I’m the head of the operational headquarters and I cannot let them go to the school without a guarantee from you that you will not kill them. Publicly guarantee their safety!” If terrorists provide such guarantees, then the question becomes a purely political one, o the personal responsibility of the terrorists who summoned them for negotiations — whether or not to start (negotiations). So, I would have made sure that the four arrived, but I would have tried to influence the terrorists by openly asking them: “You want to kill these people? You summoned them to Beslan for this?” If the terrorists guarantee their safety, I would then ask them to somehow demonstrate their goodwill. For example, a very good demand would be to release all children less than 7 years of age. Could we believe the terrorists here? On the basis of my personal experience and years of studying the behavior of terrorists, yes. They are very rational people. They know exactly what they are doing. They are ready to deliver on their promises. If they did not keep their word, and killed one of those four, I would then use it to permanently discredit them in front of the whole world and expose them as ordinary murderers. They are not commonplace killers, however, and that is the point. So, you believe that these four should certainly have been brought to Beslan? I am certain of it. If these people had come to Beslan, the authorities would not have lost face in any way since it was not a concession to terrorists. It would only show that the government is ready to negotiate if the terrorists demonstrate their good will. This is what is called negotiations. A last question: have Russian security services ever asked you for help in the training of professional negotiators? No, Russia never asks for help. When you come here, you are a spy. Other countries invite me for lectures, seminars, and training. They pay for it. I come to Russia at my own expense and I am always under suspicion. Experts in negotiations from Israel, U.S., France and other countries offered their assistance during Beslan, but were refused. Numbers On the eve of the third anniversary of the Beslan terrorist attack, 81% of Russians do not believe the government version of the events that took place in the school in 2004. These results were obtained after a comparative analysis of public opinion polls carried out by the Levada Center immediately after the terror attack, and today. It turns out that a vast majority of respondents still suspect a conspiracy by the authorities in attempting to hush up the events of September The Levada Center survey found another surprising result: fewer and fewer inhabitants (of Russia) require victory over the terrorists at any cost. In 2006, 30% of respondents believed that the authorities must make sacrifices, but not give in to political demands of the terrorists. In 2007, this number of respondents declined to 18%. Rising 9% (from 57 to 66%) were the number who believe the death of innocent people is too high a price and are ready to make concessions to the bandits for the sake of saving lives of the hostages. Views: 5644 |
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