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APPENDIX 19. Criticism of Moscow Prosecutors Office Resolutions
Written by Administrator   
, 29 2006
APPENDIX 19. Criticism of Moscow Prosecutors Office Resolutions on refusal to initiate criminal proceedings dated December 31, 2002and October 16, 2003

1. Criticism of the Resolution by the prosecutors office to not initiate criminal charges dated December 31st, 2002.


1.1. According to the Resolutions conclusions (appendix 21): the death of 114victims was certified at the scene (Pages 910from the Resolution dated December 31st, 2002), 8of the victims were taken to Veterans Hospital #1 in a state of clinical death, and since resuscitative measures at the facility had no effect, biologic death occurred from 1040minutes later. Six victims died at medical facilities at various times following their delivery.

According to the Resolution the total number of deaths was supposedly 129.

Included in this Resolution, however, are testimonies from the directors of several medical facilities, concerning the number of hostages who were declared dead in their hospitals (in addition to the 114who were declared dead at the scene and Olga Romanova, who had been earlier shot by the terrorists):

City Clinical Hospital #13 36persons,

City Hospital #7 15persons,

Veterans Hospital #1 8persons.

Thus, according to the data, the number of dead is not 129, but 174.

Moreover, the Resolution lacks data about the number of dead hostages in other hospitals (city clinical hospitals #1, 15, 23, 33, 53, 64, 79, the Sklifosovsky Research Institute, the Botkin clinical hospital, Childrens Hospital #13 and Saint Vladimirs childrens hospital, and Health Ministry hospitals #84 and 38, as shown on page 10of the resolution). The victims also have credible information that the deaths of hostages A.N.Letyago, G.M.Burban, and I.A.Finogenova were certified at City Clinical Hospital #1, while the death of hostage K.V.Kurbatova was certified at Saint Vladimirs childrens hospital.

1.2. Theinvestigators' Resolution makes an attempt to downplay, and therefore, to hide the true reason for the deaths of the hostages who were under the effects of the substances used during the assault. In several instances this substance is said to be a gaseous substance, in other it is called a gas based on derivatives of fentanyl, which works by lulling to sleep.

In reality, as can be seen from the subsequent events occurring after its application, it is a highly toxic substance whose true designation they are deliberately attempting to hide. The conclusion of the 'Protection' VTsMK (all-Russia center for medical catastrophes) of the Russian Ministry of Health (case volume 1, page 162): Contributing to the difficulty in rendering medical assistance was the high concentration of a chemical substance that could case instantaneously lethal outcomes.

One can judge the quality and incompleteness of the investigation in that the investigators never established what substance was used (its chemical composition, properties, and after-effects of use), as well as the idleness of these investigative agencies in establishing the most important aspects of the case.

1.3. Other extremely important aspects of the case were never determined as well: the presence or absence of an antidote against the substance, and the numerous contradictions in the case materials.

In the Resolution it reads: According to an explanation by the E.A.Yevdokimov, chief of anesthesiology and resuscitation for the city of Moscow, Naloxone is an specific antidote against opiates and was widely used from the very beginning in the provision of medical assistance to the hostages. In other places in the Resolution there is information to the effect that special forces soldiers injected Naloxone into a majority of the hostages

These assertions are refuted by data from the Ministry of Health: Aggravating the poor conditions effecting the organization of medical assistance were:

2) the absence of a specific antidote against the substance used" (conclusion of the 'Protection' VTsMK, Russian Ministry of Health (case volume 1, page 161).

2. Criticism of the resolution by the prosecutors office to not initiate criminal charges dated October 16th, 2003.

2.1. The Resolution to not initiate a criminal case against special forces soldiers, dated December 31st, 2002(Appendix 22) is completely unjustified.

First of all, the description of the circumstances are based on no data confirmatory proofs are absent, there are no references to case materials, and nowhere do they indicate sources of information on which they have drawn their conclusions. I.e.: there is only a fictional description of a certain story.

The Resolution provided by the prosecutor's office for the city of Moscow contains 70pages. They dedicate about one page of this Resolution, however, to direct descriptions of the special forces soldiers' actions during the period of October 2326.

2.2. According to the Resolution, the terrorists' main demand was the removal of forces from Chechen territory (pages 1and 51). The terrorists insisted on having political figures and representatives of the media participate in the negotiations (page 62).

It is not evident in the Resolution what measures were undertaken to convince the terrorists that their demands would be allegedly be carried out. Whatever they were, they would have been in stark contrast to the hard line that the authorities maintained by declaring publicly and openly the impossibility of carrying out the terrorists' demands, which threatened the lives of the hostages.

2.3. In the Resolution to not initiate a criminal case against special forces soldiers, dated October 16th, 2003, one of the reasons cited for arriving at a decision to carry out an assault, listed on page 63, is the conduct of the terrorists, who refused to carry out the release of all children and foreigners, as they had previously agreed

The negotiations, however, had some progress, since former hostage, Kazakhstan Republic citizen S.N.Gubareva has reliable information that some of the foreign hostages were to be released at 8am on October 26th. This data was available to Altynbek Sarsenbayev, former extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the Russian Federation, as did employees of the American embassy in Moscow.

In an interview for the TV program 'The State o KZ', the former Kazakhstan ambassador to Russia said the following: we agreed to the release of Kazakhstan citizens at 8am. But we didn't know that there would be an assault that night (Appendix 28.7).

The investigators' assertion that the terrorists refused to release foreigners mentioned above directly contradicts statements by the Kazakhstan ambassador and other testimony given to the investigators.

2.4. The official number of terrorists is listen as 40: 21men and 19women. Besides the 19women-terrorists in the main hall (nine along each wall and one in the center next to an explosive device), however, there were no less than 4women-terrorists on the balcony and first-floor landing. This is contained in statements by former hostages A.F.Islamgareeva (case volume 35, page 315) and S.S.Safin (case volume 25, page 344/2), who were on the first-floor landing during the capture of the building.

2.5. The investigators' assertion that terrorists had begun shooting hostages on October 26th, 2002, listed on page 63of the above mentioned Resolution, is a falsehood. Among those giving testimony are former hostages who spent all 57hours in the captured auditorium and know that there was no (intentional mass) shootings. Furthermore, the list of the dead does not indicate the names of hostages who were shot before the assault. This false assertion is given as the justification for an assault that endangered hundreds of lives.

Furthermore, the vagueness of the above Resolution summons a huge number of questions. It is not evident from the text of the Resolution who made the decision to carry out an assault on the theatrical complex. The Resolution contains only a reference to the fact that competent authorities of the Russian Federation made the decision to carry out an armed operation using special subunits of the FSB of Russia in order to rescue the hostages and render the terrorists harmless, including through their destruction. In this case, what is hidden behind the term competent authorities is absolutely unclear from the text of the Resolution.

Information concerning the responsible officials who make such fateful decisions must be in the required portion of the Resolution. It seems that the absence of data from the text of the resolution concerning officials who made so critical a decision such as carrying out an assault confirms that either the investigators do not have access to information about the specific officials who made this decision, or they are hiding these persons, since they are aware of the operation's lack of success. It is not known from the Resolution or the materials presented if these persons were questioned or what testimony they may have given. This prevents the victims from being able to judge the authenticity of that testimony.

The whole point of classifying information as secret, from a legal standpoint, is not to assist those officials in avoiding their responsibility for the disastrous consequences of their decision, but only for legitimate purposes (protecting sources and methods). In view of the absence of reasons for making secret this information, this secret classification (of names of responsible officials) is an illegitimate cover up.

Let us assume that the special operation was necessary, as the investigators assert, and carried out exclusively with the aim of rescuing hostages, the special services soldiers acting under extreme necessity, i.e.: to avert a real danger threatening the lives, health, and interests of a huge number of people the interests of the public and the government, under conditions that the imminent danger in the prevailing circumstances could not be removed by any other means, then there should be no grounds for hiding those persons who made the decision to carry out such an operation.

2.6. Not reflected in the Resolution, meaning that the investigators never established, is the time that the hostage rescue operation began. The text of the Resolution stated: early on the morning of October 26th, 2002. Such an inaccuracy in the Resolution concerning their judgment of the special forces' actions would be impermissible, and can only attest to the incompleteness of their investigation.

2.7. On page 64(of the Resolution), extremely unsatisfactory are the specified motivation and substantiation for the state of emergency in which 125people died from the actions the special services soldiers acting under extreme necessity, i.e.: to avert a real danger threatening the lives, health, and interests of a huge number of people being held in a closed space that had been booby trapped with powerful explosive devices.

First of all, it acknowledges that 125people died from the actions the special services soldiers.

The substantiation for their acting under extreme necessity is unconvincing. First of all, the assault could not have prevented (the terrorists) blowing up the building. This fact is confirmed by the text of the Resolution, which on page 69indicates that, on the terrorists' part, there was a real danger of blowing up explosive devices, which they could put into action instantly, and to which they were so disposed, which could have led to the complete destruction of all the hostages Furthermore, it is noted in the Resolution that the terrorists actively returned fire during the assault using 13assault rifles and 8pistols. I.e.: the investigators recognize that the terrorists had the ability to set off an explosion all throughout the assault, and that the actions of the special forces had no real ability to prevent such an explosion with the help of the gas.

2.8. In the Resolution they indicate that: the death of practically all (125) hostages began with acute respiratory and cardiac insufficiency, caused by a combination of unfavorable factors, which are dangerous to life and health and also by respiratory disorders caused by the action of the unidentified chemical substance (or substances) used by law enforcement agencies during the course of the special hostage rescue operation on October 26th, 2002. That the investigators never established exactly what substance was used for the special operation attests to the incompleteness of the investigation conducted by the Moscow city prosecutor's office. There is no estimation of the outcome of actions by the special forces, who used this unidentified chemical substance, or a proper estimation of the expediency of such a substance being used.

2.9. Besides this, the Resolution indicates that the multifactor character of the causes of death rules out a direct cause and effect connection between the gaseous chemical substance (or substances) used and death. In the given case this connection bears a coincidental character, since their is objective reasons to believe that, in the absence of the factors enumerated above, the application of this gaseous substance (or substances) could not lead to death. However, the unfavorable factors listed by the investigators are not in themselves incompatible with life, and could lead to death. In fact, there was not a single death (from these factors) during the course of 57hours prior to the use of the gas.

It was specifically this unidentified chemical substance that led to the deaths of a large number of hostages, including relatives of the plaintiffs.

Consequently, the deaths of the hostages have a direct cause and effect connection with the toxic substance, and absent this (substance), they would not have occurred.

2.10. It follows from the Resolution that competent authorities did not make a decision to require the destruction of all the terrorists without exception, but their neutralization (rendering harmless), which does not compulsorily assume destruction. There is no estimation of the complete destruction of all of the potential accused, and, simultaneously, witnesses of what happened (in the theater). Furthermore, all potential civil defendants were destroyed, and the state itself did not take upon itself full compensation for damages.

2.11. To justify the actions of the special forces who undertook an assault using gas, the investigators indicate that the deaths of 912were allegedly avoided.

On pages 6970 of the Resolution the following assertion is made: As a result of the correct decision made by competent authorities of the Russian Federation about the need to release the hostages, and the competent actions of the special forces during the time of their rescue, the criminal activities of the terrorists was put to an end, and avoided a much greater threat, which could have occurred from the explosion of explosive devices, which the terrorist were intending to use and the hostages had taken these intentions to be real, which could have led to a massive loss of life (912 persons) and the undermining of Russian authority in the international arena.

Such an assertion is clearly unjustified.

As indicated above, an assault using gas only provoked, but did not prevent, a blast. The Resolution asserts that the terrorists were ready in an instant to set off their explosives. The blast did not occur for reasons that the investigators did not establish. The real reason that there was no blast is not found in the Resolution, and is one of the main gaps in their investigation.

2.12. We cannot let pass the assertion by representatives of the prosecutor's office that the setting off (of the terrorists') explosives could cause the collapse of the support columns and the building to cave in, leading to a fatal outcome. According to tests made by technical examination of the explosives, contained in volume 59of the criminal case, the experts did not establish this to be the case.

2.13. There is incompleteness in the investigation as to the actual number of hostages in the building at the moment of the assault. The investigators reference 912persons. However, at the moment of the assault there were actually a lot fewer person than indicated in the Resolution. It is a well-known fact that from October 23rd through October 26th, 2002, the terrorists released a number of hostages. Nevertheless, facts concerning hostages released by the special services and by the terrorists are not reflected in the Resolution, and the number of hostages found in the building at the moment of the assault is distorted substantially.

2.14. This Resolution as well as the Resolution from December 31st, 2002, understates substantially the number of hostages killed.

2.15. The Resolution makes no mention of the time the assault began, or the beginning of hostage evacuation. Furthermore, the resolution contains no information on the provision of first aid or special medical assistance to the hostages who were subjected the action of the chemical substance as a result of the assault.

2.16. Given the circumstances, the phrase contained in that part of the Resolution giving the motivation (for the special operation) as preventing the undermining: of the authority of Russian at the international level sounds blasphemous.

 
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